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Abstract
Consider a society where all agents initially play “fair” and one agent
invents a “cheating” strategy such as doping in sports. Which factors
determine the success of the new cheating strategy? In order to study
this question we consider an evolutionary game with heterogenous agents
who can either play fair or cheat. We model heterogeneity by assuming
that the players are either high or low types. Three factors determine
the imitation dynamics of the model: the location and the type of the
innovator, the distribution of types, and the information available to the
agents. In particular we find that the economy is more likely to end up in
a state where all agents cheat if the innovator is of low type or when the
agents are maximally segregated.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we consider an evolutionary game where agents competing for a
prize can either play fair or cheat. We want to identify the determinants that
eventually lead to an absorbing state of the imitation dynamics in which all
agents use the cheating strategy when initially all but one agent play fair. We
are interested to identify the role of heterogeneity and the role of information for
this process. In particular, we would like to know how the distribution of types,
i.e. the segregation of the population determines the imitation dynamics.
To study these issues we consider an evolutionary game in which a finite
number of infinitely lived agents are matched pairwise to play a 2×2 stage game.
In each stage game, the agents compete for a prize of value w by either playing
“fair” or “cheat.” Agents are of two types: high or low. High types have a natural
advantage over low types: they obtain the prize w with certainty if they meet a
low type and if both use the same strategy. If, however, a low type cheats against
a fair playing high type, he beats the high type with certainty and receives the
prize w. If two players of the same type meet and if both use the same strategy,
they share the prize of value w. Cheating is costly where the cost c satisfies
0 < c < w.1
Because our agents are heterogenous there are two stage games. First, if two
agents of the same type meet, the stage game is a Prisoner’s Dilemma where
cheating (playing fair) is the dominant strategy if the cost of cheating is suffi-
ciently low (high). Second, if two agents of opposite type meet, the stage game
is an asymmetric game similar to a matching penny game. In this game, the low
type’s best response is the strategy that is not used by the high type, and the
high type’s best response is the strategy that the low type is using.
In each period each agent is matched sequentially to all other agents, i.e.
agents interact globally. At the end of the period, each agent observes the strate-
gies and average payoffs of a subset of all agents, called the information set of
an agent. In the following period, agents imitate the strategy with the highest
average payoff in their information set.2 To formalize these sets we locate the
1One application we have in mind is the spread of a new doping substance in sports, where
athletes with different talents may learn how to use this substance to improve their winning
probabilities. Other applications are crime or corruption. The relevant question here is under
which circumstances a previously peaceful (honest) society can turn violent (corrupt).
2A few years ago at the Tour de France, some cyclists began to use somewhat odd looking
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agents on a circle as in Ellison (1993). In most parts of the paper, we focus on
two information settings: “local” information and “global” information. With
local information agents observe the strategies and payoffs of their immediate
neighbors on the circle only. If agents have global information, they observe the
strategies and payoffs of all agents.3
In order to get a benchmark we first analyze the model when all agents are
identical. In this case the stage game is a Prisoner’s Dilemma where cheating is
the dominant strategy if c < w/2. With equal agents we find that the information
setting has no influence for the set of absorbing states. That is, we show that
the cardinality of the information set only affects the time elapsing until the set
of absorbing states is reached. Moreover, the location of the innovator of the
cheating strategy is irrelevant - a result which is hardly surprising given that all
agents are equal.
These results motivated us to study the role of heterogeneity in our model.
With heterogenous agents there are three crucial factors that determine the
spread of the cheating strategy: the location and the type of the innovator of
the cheating strategy, the distribution of types on the circle, and the information
available to the agents. These factors determine whether the innovator is able to
infect his neighbors and eventually to contaminate the entire population. Since
many different distributions of types on the circle are feasible - each of them hav-
ing potentially different implications for the limiting distribution - we focus on
two polar cases: maximal segregation and minimal segregation. In a maximally
segregated population high types and low types are allocated in two clusters so
nose stickers. They were supposed to increase breathing capacity and thereby the prospects
of winning the race. Very soon after the first few cyclists had used these stickers, they were
adopted by virtually all others. However, the following year, the stickers had almost disap-
peared again presumably because they did not enhance performance. This is an example of the
imitation behavior we have in mind. We belief that it also describe well how illegal performance
enhancing substances, which are not observed in public, spread in sports.
3In sports, say tennis, all agents compete against all other agents (global interaction). Nev-
ertheless, the players - for obvious reasons - only share information about the use of illegal
performance enhancing drugs with their best mates (local information). To describe a sit-
uation in which agents interact globally but have only local information about payoffs and
strategies, consider a finite number of myopic agents in a computer lab where the computers
are allocated in a circle. In each period each agent plays a stage game against each other agent
in the lab. At the end of the period each agent observes his average payoff for the period. In
addition he observes the screens of his immediate neighbors which reveals their strategies and
their average payoffs in that period. Using this information, each agent at the end of the period
imitates the strategy with the highest average payoff.
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that there are only two players of each type that have a neighbor of the oppo-
site type. In a minimally segregated population each agent has two neighbors of
opposite type.
The following results emerge from the model with heterogenous agents and
local information. First, the population is more likely to end up in an absorb-
ing state where all agents cheat if the innovator is a low type. Second, if the
innovator is a low type, then a minimally segregated population is more resis-
tant against the cheating strategy than a maximally segregated population. The
reason for this result is that in a minimally segregated population each low type
(including the innovator) is surrounded by high types who are less prone to im-
itate the cheating strategy. Third, in contrast, if the innovator is a high type, a
maximally segregated population is more resistant against the cheating strategy
than a minimally segregated population. The reason for this result is that the
innovator is again surrounded by high types who are less prone to imitate the
cheating strategy.
The role of information with heterogenous agents is as follows. First, with
global information, in contrast to local information, the location and the type
of the innovator of the cheating strategy and the distribution of types on the
circle are irrelevant. Second, local information reduces the spread of the cheating
strategy if agents are minimally segregated relative to a situation where agents
have global information. For a maximally segregated population this result is
only true if the innovator is a high type. Third, with local information some
agents under- and some overestimate the true benefit of the cheating strategy.
There is no such effect with complete information where each player type knows
the true benefit of each strategy for his type.
Our paper is most closely related to Ellison (1993), Eshel et al. (1998), and
Kandori et al. (1993). Kandori et al. (1993) consider the limiting distribution
when individual mutation rates go to zero for the class of 2 × 2 stage games.
The players’ period payoffs are the expected values of the stage game given the
(distribution of) strategy choices of all players. Like Kandori et al. (1993) we
assume “global interaction.” Ellison (1993) investigates the limiting distributions
and the speed of convergence in a similar model as Kandori et al. (1993). The
crucial difference is that players interact and obtain information locally. Also,
Ellison (1993) focuses on coordination games.
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Summarizing, Kandori et al. (1993) investigate global interaction and global
information and Ellison (1993) local interaction and local information. In con-
trast, we combine local information with global interaction. Moreover, we intro-
duce heterogeneity among agents, which generates different stage games. Finally,
we adopt the imitation rule of Eshel et al. (1998) where players can only play
the strategies they observe in their information set. Like Ellison (1993), Eshel et
al. (1998) may be classified as a local interaction and local information game.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the basic model
with homogenous agents. Sections 3 and 4 analyze the model with heterogenous
agents and global and local information, respectively. In Section 5, we allow for
mutations. Section 6 concludes.
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2 The Model with Homogeneous Agents
In this section, we set up the model with homogeneous agents. We first describe
the stage game, specify how agents are located and how they adopt or choose
new strategies. We then analyze the absorbing strategy states.
2.1 The Stage Game
We consider a finite population with N > 1 agents denoted by i = 1, ..., N who
live forever. In every period t, the agents are sequentially matched to all other
agents to play a 2 × 2 stage game. In each stage game, the agents compete
for a prize of value w. The strategy space is {C,D}, where C stands for playing
“clean” respectively fair and D for cheating respectively playing “doped.” Within
a period, a player cannot change his or her pure strategy. Furthermore, mixed
strategies are ruled out.
The payoffs of the stage game are as follows. If both agents play the strategy
C, each gets w2 . If both play D, each gets
w
2 − c, where c ∈ (0, w) is the cost
of cheating. It reflects the fact that each agent prefers to obtain the prize w by
playing C rather than by using D. Finally, if an agent plays D against a clean
player, he gets w − c and the clean player 0. Thus, the payoff matrix is
A =
(
w
2 0
w − c w2 − c
)
. (1)
The stage game defined in (1) is a Prisoner’s Dilemma (Weibull 1995). If c ≶ w2 ,
D, respectively C, is the dominant strategy.
Agent i’s period payoff in period t, ui,t, is the average payoff from the N − 1
matches, i.e.
ui,t(σi,t,σ−i,t) =
1
N − 1
∑
−i
a(σi,t,σ−i,t)
where σi,t is his strategy in period t, σ−i,t are the strategies chosen by all other
players in period t, and the payoffs a(., .) are the corresponding elements of A in
(1).
2.2 Location and Imitation
In order to model incomplete information, we assume that agents are located
on a circle on the positions 1, 2, 3, ..., N . In each period, each agent i obtains
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information about the period payoffs and the strategies chosen by the agents
i ± k (modulo N) with k ∈ {1, ..., $N2 %}, where $N2 % is the largest integer ≤ N2 .
Dropping the arguments in ui,t(σi,t,σ−i,t), we define agent i’s information set
Gi,t(k) as
Gi,t(k) = {(uj,t,σj,t) | j = i− k, ..., i + k} .
If k = $N2 %, the information set contains information about all agents on the
circle. In this case, we say that agents have global information. If k < $N2 % the
information set contains not all relevant information. If k = 1, agents observe
strategies and payoffs of their direct neighbors only. We call this information
setting local information.
We now turn to the question how agents use their information. Following
Eshel et al. (1998), we assume that at the end of every period t, the agents observe
Gi,t(k). In the following period, they play the strategy that generated the highest
average payoff.4 If they observe but one strategy within their information set,
they play this strategy next period. Let dj,t denote an indicator variable, which
takes the value 0 if agent j plays C and the value 1 if he plays D. Then, if
strategies C and D are observed in Gi,t(k), the observed payoff difference ∆i,t is
∆i,t =
∑i+k
j=i−k dj,t · uj,t∑i+k
j=i−k dj,t
−
∑i+k
j=i−k(1− dj,t) · uj,t∑i+k
j=i−k(1− dj,t)
.
The first term is the average payoff of those agents in the information set that
play D and the second term is the average payoff of those agents that play C.
The imitation dynamics satisfies the following rule.
Definition 1 The imitation rule is
σi,t+1 =
 σi,t if ∆i,t = 0C if ∆i,t < 0
D if ∆i,t > 0
. (2)
if both strategies C and D are observed in Gi,t(k). Otherwise, the agent continues
to use the same strategy.
4Agents who choose strategies according to an imitation rule can interpret the information
they receive in two different ways. They can either imitate the most successful player or the
most successful strategy they observe. The former imitation rule is used by Vega-Redondo
(1997) and Alos-Ferrer et al. (2000) and others, the latter e.g. by Ellison and Fudenberg
(1995). We will adhere to an imitation rule of the second kind, where success of a strategy is
measured by its average payoff.
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The imitation rule implies that if ∆i,t = 0, then σi,t+1 = σi,t, and for ∆i,t ≶ 0,
we have σi,t+1 = C, respectively D. If a strategy is not observed in an agent’s
information set, then the agent continues to use the strategy of the current period.
Note that an agent’s behavior depends solely on the strategies observed in his
neighborhood in the immediate past. That is, neither the shadow of the future
nor the shadow of the more distant past bear any weight for the choice of strategy
(Berninghaus et al. 2003).
In the following we will suppress the time index t. We denote by y the number
of agents playing C. This allows us to write agent i’s payoff of playing di ∈ {0, 1}
as
ui(di, y) =
y − 1
N − 1
w
2
+ di
(
N
N − 1
w
2
− c
)
. (3)
The first term in (3) is the period payoff of an agent who plays C (di = 0). The
second term, which depends only on the population size N and the cost c, is
the additional payoff for an agent of playing D (di = 1). For a homogeneous
population, (3) implies that an agent i who observes C and D in Gi(k) compares
uj(1, y) and uh(0, y) for some j, h. Thus, ∆i = uj(1, y) − uh(0, y) = N(N−1) w2 − c.
Note that ∆i is independent of y.
The model exhibits a finite population effect. Because agents do not play
against themselves, ∆i only approaches the value
w
2−c as N goes to infinity. Thus,
for any finite N and for c ∈ (w2 , NN−1 w2 ), D is a strictly dominated strategy and
nevertheless ∆i > 0 for all i who observe the strategy D in their neighborhood.
That is, despite D being a strictly dominated strategy, all individuals will end
up playing it. The reason for this result is that an agent playing D is matched to
one D−player less than an agent playing C. This increases the benefit of using
strategy D relative to C.
2.3 Absorbing States
A state is a specification of which agents play C and which play D. At time t,
we describe the state st of the system by an N -tuple
st = (σ1t,σ2t, ...,σNt) ∈ S ≡ {C,D}N ,
where S is the set of possible states. If i and j are two possible strategy states
in S, pij is the probability that the imitation rule changes the system to state j
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given that i is the current state. The imitation rule in (2) and the non-stochastic
nature of the payoffs result in a deterministic process such that pij is either 0 or
1. The collection {pij}i,j∈S, together with an initial state, is a Markov process on
S. We will refer to this Markov process as the imitation dynamics of our model.
We are interested in the absorbing states of the imitation dynamics, which
are defined as in Eshel et al. (1998).
Definition 2 A set of states is absorbing if it is a minimal set of states with the
property that the Markov process can lead into this set but not out of it.
An absorbing set of states may contain only one state. If an absorbing set
contains more than one state, the Markov process cycles between the states con-
tained in the absorbing set.
¿From now on, we normalize w = 1 (and consequently c is now assumed to
be ∈ (0, 1)). Moreover, we concentrate on the polar cases; either the size of the
information set is k = 1 or k = $N2 %. In the case of local information (k = 1),
each agent observes the strategies and the payoffs of his direct neighbors only. In
the case of global information (k = $N2 %), each agent obtains information about
the strategies and the payoffs of all agents on the circle.
2.4 The Role of Information
Throughout the paper, we study the spread of D in a population in which in
t = 1 all agents but one play C.
2.4.1 Global Information
If σi = C (D) ∀i, we denote this state by "C ( "D). Under global information, we
obtain the following result.
Proposition 1 When agents are homogenous and have global information, then
the following is true. If c ≶ N2(N−1) , the absorbing state "D, respectively "C, is
reached in period 2.
The proof is straightforward. If all agents observe the strategies and payoffs
of all other agents, ∆i is the same for all i = 1, 2, ..., N . Consequently, when an
agent introduces D in period 1, depending on whether ∆i is positive or negative,
all agents will play C or D from period 2 on until the end of time. This result
has been shown to hold by Kandori et al. (1993) in a more general setting.
9
2.4.2 Local information
We now consider the case where the agents observe their immediate neighbors
only (k = 1).
Proposition 2 When agents are homogenous and have local information, then
the following is true. If c < N2(N−1) , the absorbing state "D is reached in period
t = 1 + $N2 %. If c > N2(N−1) , the absorbing state "C is reached in period 2.
The proof of Proposition 2 is intuitive. If c < N2(N−1) , ∆i is positive and all
agents that are aware of strategy D imitate it in the following period. Because
k = 1, it takes $N2 % periods until all agents have learned and adopted D. If
c > N2(N−1) , ∆i is negative. Consequently, D dies out immediately.
Comparing Proposition 1 with Proposition 2, we see that the size of the
information set only affects the time elapsing until the absorbing state is reached.
In particular, it does not matter which player introduces strategy D because all
agents are identical. In the following section we therefore introduce heterogeneity
among the agents to see how this influences the imitation dynamics.
3 Heterogenous Agents with Global Informa-
tion
In this section we investigate the role of heterogeneity when agents are globally
informed. In Section 4 we then analyze local information.
3.1 Asymmetric Games
We introduce heterogeneity by assuming that agents are either of high type (H)
or low type (L). An agent’s type is neither known by himself nor by any other
agent. Agents are still matched pairwise and the payoffs are as follows. If an
H-type is matched to an L-type and both agents use the same strategy (either D
or C), the H-type wins with certainty. If an H-type is matched to an L-type and
only the L-type uses D, then the L-type wins with certainty. Thus, an L-type
prevails over an H-type if and only if he plays D and the latter plays C. The
payoff matrices for the asymmetric matches are
AH,L =
(
w 0
w − c w − c
)
and AL,H =
(
0 0
w − c −c
)
,
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where for example AH,L denotes the payoffs to agent of type H when playing
against an agent of type L. For symmetric matches, the matrices are AH,H =
AL,L = A as in (1).
If two agents of the same type meet, the stage game is a prisoner’s dilemma
where strategy D is the dominant strategy if c < 1/2 as with homogenous agents.
In contrast, if two agents of opposite type meet the game is asymmetric and has
a unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. In this case, the stage game is
a matching penny game where each player’s best response is the strategy not
chosen by the other agent.
We denote by yH the number of H-types playing C, and by yL the number of
L-types playing C. The numbers of H-types and L-types are denoted by nH and
nL, respectively, with nH + nL = N . The period payoffs of H-types and L-types
are
uH(di, yH , yL) =
yH + 2yL − 1
2(nH + nL − 1) + di
(
nH + 2nL − 2yL
2(nH + nL − 1) − c
)
and (4)
uL(di, yH , yL) =
yL − 1
2(nH + nL − 1) + di
(
nL + 2yH
2(nH + nL − 1) − c
)
. (5)
Note that the second term in (4) depends negatively on yL, while the second term
in (5) depends positively on yH . The additional value of playing D for H-types
(i.e. the second term in (4)) decreases with the number of L-types playing C.
The additional value of playing D for L-types increases with the number of H-
types playing C. This is quite intuitive. Since an H-type prevails over an L-type
playing C with certainty, playing D becomes less attractive the more L-types
play C. On the other hand, because an L-type prevails over an H-type if and
only if he plays D and the H-type C, D becomes more attractive to L-types as
the number of H-types playing C increases.
3.2 The Role of Information
The imitation rule (2) still applies and we continue to study the spread of D
from an initial situation where all agents but one play C. A state where all
agents of the same type play the same strategy is denoted by −→σH−→σL where the
first component means that all H-types play σH , the second component that all
L-types play σL.
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Proposition 3 When agents are heterogenous and have global information, then
if c ≶ nH+nL2(nH+nL−1) , the absorbing state "D "D ("C "C) is reached in period 2.
Proof: The proof is in the Appendix."
According to Proposition 3 when information is global, then it is immaterial
which type of player innovates D. Intuitively, with global information all agents
have the same information. Consequently, all agents follow the same decision
rule.
¿From Propositions 2 and 3 we see that heterogeneity does not affect the
absorbing states, if agents have information about strategies and payoffs of all
agents but no information about types. In the following we will see that het-
erogeneity matters if agents can recognize the types of all agents, or if they are
locally informed about strategies and payoffs. Before we consider local informa-
tion in Section 4, let us consider the model when all agents observe all strategies,
all payoffs, and all types. We call this information structure the “complete infor-
mation” benchmark. With complete information, agents of the same type make
the same strategy decisions. Note that for the complete information benchmark
we interpret the imitation rule (2) as follows. When applying (2), agents of the
same type compare only payoffs and strategies across agents of their own type.5
We obtain the following result.
Proposition 4 When agents are heterogenous and have complete information,
then the following is true. If c < min{ nH2(N−1) , nL2(N−1)}, the absorbing state is "D "D.
If
c ∈
[
min{ nH
2(N − 1) ,
nL
2(N − 1)},max{
nH + 2nL
2(N − 1) ,
2nH + nL
2(N − 1) }
]
,
the absorbing set is
{
"C "D, "D "D, "D "C, "C "C
}
. If c > max{nH+2nL2(N−1) , 2nH+nL2(N−1) }, the
absorbing state is "C "C.
Proof: The proof is in the Appendix."
Since all players have both strategies available at any point in time, agents of
the same type will always play the same strategy. Obviously, if costs are small
5If no agent of one type plays D (C), we assume that agents of this type can calculate the
hypothetical payoff of playing D (C) for their type and have both strategies at their disposal
at any point in time. Otherwise, D would trivially at most spread among the types where
innovation occurred.
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(large), all agents play D (C). However, in contrast to the game with global
information, there is an absorbing set in which agents cycle between C and D.
This absorbing set is attained if costs are such that D (C) pays for a single agent
of either type when all others play C (D).6
In the remainder of the paper, we concentrate on heterogenous agents with
local information.
4 Heterogenous Agents with Local Information
With heterogenous types and local information, the allocation of types along the
circle matters because it affects the payoffs of the strategies C and D which an
agent observes in his information set Gi(1). Consequently, in contrast to the case
with homogeneous agents, Gi(1) does not reveal the true benefit of a strategy
to a player. For example, a large payoff of a neighbor can now be due to either
the strategy chosen (which is observed) or the unobservable H-type. In this
section, we first classify the agents according to their location, which determines
the perceived period payoff of the strategies C and D. We then investigate the
implication of local information and heterogeneity for the imitation dynamics.
4.1 The Role of Information
An agent whose immediate neighbors are of the same type is called an interior
player. We denote interior players by H I and LI , respectively. If one neighbor
is an H-type and the other one an L-type, we call the player an edge player and
denote him by HE or LE, respectively. An agent whose two neighbors are not of
his type is called a double-edge player, which we abbreviate by HEE and LEE,
respectively. For the purpose of clarification, we display an example:
HEHELELILEHEELEEHEHIHIHIHELELEHEHIHELEE
Note that the players at both ends (HE on position 1 and LEE on position N on
the circle) are immediate neighbors. Let us now determine the strategy choices
for the three locations by calculating the decision terms ∆ introduced above.
6Cycling also occurs in Berentsen and Lengwiler (2004). In this model the authors consider
the replicator dynamics in a model with heterogenous agents. The stage game is a Prisoner’s
Dilemma when two agents of the same type meet or a matching penny game when two agents
of opposite type meet.
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Interior Player An interior player has only information about agents of his
own type. Consequently, an interior player only observes differences in payoffs if
different strategies have been played. We write these payoff differences as
∆HI (yH , yL) = uH(1, yH , yL)− uH(0, yH , yL) = nH + 2nL − 2yL2(N − 1) − c (6)
∆LI (yH , yL) = uL(1, yH , yL)− uL(0, yH , yL) = nL + 2yH2(N − 1) − c. (7)
If ∆HI ≶ 0 (or ∆LI ≶ 0) , then HI (LI) plays C, respectively D next period.
Edge Player Let us first consider an edge player of type H. Such a player
has an L-type and an H-type as neighbors, i.e. either LHEH or HHEL. We
concentrate on LHEH because HHEL is analyzed in the same way. An HE-
player faces eight (= 23) possible strategy strings in Gi,t(1). Two strings are
CCC and DDD. In this case the agent does not change his strategy. The other
six strings are
CDD︸ ︷︷ ︸
1st
CCD CDC︸ ︷︷ ︸
2nd
DDC DCD︸ ︷︷ ︸
3rd
DCC︸ ︷︷ ︸
4th
. (8)
Consider, for example, the first term in (8). It means that “L plays C, HE
plays D and H plays D.” The strategy strings CCD and CDC do not differ
with respect to the observed average payoffs. In either case, the L-type and one
H-type play C, while the other H-type plays D. Similarly, the strategy strings
DDC and DCD yield also the same average payoffs for D and C, respectively.
We can summarize the decisions of HE by considering the observed differences
∆qHE , where the superscript q refers to the rank of the term in (8). In the
Appendix we show that the following ranking holds:
∆1HE ≥ ∆2HE ≥ ∆HI ≥ ∆3HE ≥ ∆4HE (9)
Thus, if for a clean edge player in a DCC string ∆4HE > 0, all edge players and
all interior players will play D in the following period.
An edge player of type L has an H-type and an L-type in his information
group. We analyze HLEL because LLEH is analyzed in the same way. The
possible strategy strings in the information group of LE are given in (8). We
show in the Appendix that
∆4LE ≥ ∆3LE ≥ ∆LI ≥ ∆2LE ≥ ∆1LE . (10)
14
Next we show that some agents systematically over- or underestimate the true
benefit of the cheating strategy D. Recall that an interior player only observes
agents of his own type. Consequently, his decision term ∆LI or ∆HI reflects the
true payoff difference of the two strategies for his type, i.e. an interior player’s
assessment of a strategy is not distorted by heterogeneity. In contrast, according
to (9) and (10), edge players systematically over- or underestimate the payoffs of
C or D to their type as defined below.
Definition 3 We say that an agent overestimates (underestimates) the payoff
of strategy D for his type if his decision term ∆ is greater (smaller) than the
decision term of an interior player of his type.
For example, edge players of type H overestimate D whenever their L-type
neighbor plays C, i.e. ∆1HE ≥ ∆2HE ≥ ∆HI . The reason for this is that an L-type
player’s payoff using C is always zero except when matched to another L-type
player using C in which case his payoff is 1/2. In contrast, an H-type who plays
C receives a positive payoff when matched to another H-type or to an L-type
using C. Consequently, an edge player of type H underestimates the benefit of
strategy C, respectively overestimates D, when his L-type neighbor plays C.
There are two crucial features of local information. First, certain agents (edge
players and double-edge players) under- or overestimate strategy D, respectively,
C. There is no such effect with complete information where each player type
knows the true benefit of each strategy for his type. Second, local information
permits some agents (interior players) to observe the true payoff difference of the
two strategies for his type as explained above. In contrast, with global information
and heterogenous players no agent ever observes the true payoff difference for his
type.
Double-Edge Player Finally, let us investigate the behavior of double-edge
players. The information group for an HEE-type and an LEE-type respectively
are composed of the following types:
LHEEL and HLEEH.
Thus, the relevant strategy strings are
DCD︸ ︷︷ ︸
1st
CCD DCC︸ ︷︷ ︸
2nd
DDC CDD︸ ︷︷ ︸
3rd
CDC︸ ︷︷ ︸
4th
. (11)
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In the Appendix we show that the following ranking holds,
∆3HEE > ∆HI > ∆
2
HEE and ∆
2
LEE > ∆LI > ∆
3
LEE . (12)
Like edge players, double-edge players over- or underestimate the payoff of strat-
egy D to their type.
4.2 Maximal Segregation
Recall that we want to study how the strategy D evolves in a population in which
initially all players but one play C. The agent who first plays D is called the
innovator. Two factors determine the spread of D: The allocation of types along
the circle and the location and type of the innovator.
We now consider a distribution of types that we call maximal segregation. In
such a population H-types and L-types are allocated in two clusters as follows:
HHH...HHLLL...LLL
In a maximally segregated population, there are only two edge players for each
type and no double-edge players. In order to simplify the analysis, we assume
that the number of H-types and L-types is the same, i.e. nH = nL = n =
N
2 .
4.2.1 Innovation and absorbing states
As explained above, for each type there are three classes of agents; interior, edge
and double-edge players. Within the same class agents may choose different
strategies because they have different information sets. Consequently, we have
to distinguish the location of the innovator. Innovation by an interior player has
a different implication for the imitation dynamics than an innovation from an
edge player. Moreover, we have also to distinguish among interior players. An
innovation through an interior player who is located within other interior players
has different consequences than an innovation from an interior player who is
located next to an edge player. We call these special interior players next-to-edge
players and give them the superscript NE, while we still denote all other interior
players by superscript I.
Proposition 5 If an L-type introduces D, then for c < 2n2(N−1) the absorbing
state is "D "D, for c ∈
(
2n
2(N−1) ,
3n
2(N−1)
)
it is "C "D∗, and for c > 3n2(N−1) it is "C "C.
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If an H-type introduces D, then the following is true.
(i) If he is an interior player, then for c ≶ n2(N−1) , the absorbing state is "D "D,
respectively "C "C.
(ii) If he is a next-to-edge player, then for c < n+12(N−1) , the absorbing state is "D "D,
for c ∈
(
n+1
2(N−1) ,
n+2
2(N−1)
)
, it is "D "C∗, for c ∈
(
n+2
2(N−1) ,
2n− 12
2(N−1)
)
it is "D "D, and for
c >
2n− 12
2(N−1) , it is "C "C.
(iii) If he is an edge player, then for c < n+12(N−1) , the absorbing state is "D "D,
for c ∈
(
n+1
2(N−1) ,
n+2
2(N−1)
)
, it is "D "C∗, for c ∈
(
n+2
2(N−1) ,
2n− 12
2(N−1)
)
it is "D "D, for c ∈(
2n− 12
2(N−1) ,
3n−1
2(N−1)
)
, it is "C "D∗, and for c > 3n−12(N−1) , it is "C "C.
Proof: The proof is in the Appendix."
The absorbing state "C "D∗ ( "D "C∗ ) is identical to "C "D ( "D "C) except that edge
players of type L play C or cycle between C and D depending on c and n.
Interestingly, the location of the innovator is irrelevant if the innovator is an L-
type. In contrast, if the innovator is an H-type, the location matters. Finally,
the number of agents playing C can decrease in c when the innovation occurs
through an HNE- or an HE-type.
Figure 1: Maximal segregation, n = 8.
HI "D "D "C "C
HNE "D "D "D "C∗ "D "D "C "C
HE "D "D "D "C∗ "D "D "C "D∗ "C "C
L "D "D "C "D∗ "C "C
c
0 830
9
30
10
30
14 12
30
23
30 1
Proposition 5 is illustrated for n = 8 in Figure 1. It displays the role of the
type and the location of the innovator. First, if the cost c is drawn at random,
then the population is more likely to end up in the absorbing state "D "D when the
innovator is an L-type than when he is an H-type. Second, among the H-types
the location of the innovator is crucial. If the innovation arises from an HNE- or
an HE-type, then again "D "D is more likely than if the innovation arises from an
HI-type. In this sense, innovations by edge or next-to-edge H-types have similar
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consequences for the imitation dynamics as those by L-types. Third, the number
of agents playing C is non-monotonic in c.
Figure 2: Maximal segregation, infinite n.
HI "D "D "C "C
HNE "D "D "C "C
HE "D "D "C "D∗ "C "C
L "D "D "C "D∗ "C "C
c
0 14
1
2
3
4 1
An interesting case is the limiting case when there is no finite population effect
(n →∞), depicted in Figure 2. In this case the absorbing state "D "C∗ disappears.
Without a finite population effect, the difference between an innovation by an
HI-type and a HNE- or HE-type can be seen more easily. For c ∈ (1/4, 1/2)
innovating HE- and HNE-types infect L-type players, which does not happen if
the innovator is an HI-type. Note that in this case innovations by L-types or HE-
and HNE-types have almost the same consequences for the imitation dynamics.
4.3 Minimal Segregation of Types
After having characterized the absorbing states when the population is maximally
segregated, we now consider the polar case of a minimally segregated population.
This means that we look at a population in which types are located as follows:
HLHLHLHL...HLHLHLHL.
Evidently, a minimally segregated population consists of double-edge players only.
Consequently, there are only two different positions where the strategy D can be
introduced, HEE and LEE. Again, we assume nH = nL = n.
4.3.1 Absorbing States
Recall that in a maximally segregated population, all agents of the same type
play the same strategy in the absorbing state (with the only exception of edge-
players of type L in some absorbing states). In contrast, in a minimally segregated
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population, not all agents of the same type will end up playing the same strategy.
This requires some additional notation.
We denote by C˜yH C˜yL a strategy state where the number of H-types and L-
types playing C is yH and yL, respectively. In such a state, all agents of either
type who play the same strategy are next to each other. Let us define y¯ as the
greatest nonnegative odd (even) integer smaller than
2c (N − 1)− n− 1
2
if n is even (odd). Note that if 2c (N − 1) − n − 12 < 0, i.e. c <
n+ 12
2(N−1) , we
have y¯ = 0. In this case, the absorbing state is C˜0C˜0 where all agents play D.
It is again possible that an absorbing set is attained in which two L-types cycle
between D and C. We denote such an absorbing set by C˜yH C˜
∗
yL
.
Proposition 6 If an H-type introduces D, then the following is true. If c <
n+ 12
2(N−1) , the absorbing state is C˜0C˜0, for
n+ 12
2(N−1) < c <
2n− 12
2(N−1) it is C˜y¯C˜
∗
y¯−1, for
2n− 12
2(N−1) < c <
3n−1
2(N−1) it is C˜n−1C˜n, and for c >
3n−1
2(N−1) , it is C˜nC˜n.
If an L-type introduces D, then the following is true. If c <
n+ 12
2(N−1) , the absorbing
state is C˜0C˜0, for
n+ 12
2(N−1) < c <
2n+ 12
2(N−1) it is C˜y¯C˜
∗
y¯−1, and for c >
2n+ 12
2(N−1) it is
C˜nC˜n.
Proof: The proof is in the Appendix."
Several comments are in order here. First, in a minimally segregated popula-
tion the type of the innovator does not affect the absorbing states significantly. It
only matters if
2n− 12
2(N−1) < c <
3n−1
2(N−1) . In this case, the absorbing state is C˜n−1C˜n
if the innovator is an H-type. Second, if the innovator infects its neighbors so
that strategy D begins to spread, the spread can be only blocked by H-types.
Consequently, in any absorbing state where both strategies survive and where
more than one player adopts strategy D there will be always one L−player more
using D than H-players, i.e. the absorbing state is of type C˜y¯C˜∗y¯−1. Third, the
absorbing state C˜n−1C˜n is special because the innovator is a H−type, which is
not able to infect his L-type neighbors. Nevertheless, he continues to use D be-
cause strategy D yields a higher payoff in his information set. Consequently, the
initial strategy string is stationary.
We illustrate Proposition 6 for n = 8 in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Minimal segregation, n = 8.
H C˜0C˜0 C˜y¯C˜∗y¯−1 C˜n−1C˜n C˜nC˜n
L C˜0C˜0 C˜y¯C˜∗y¯−1 C˜nC˜n
c
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23
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Finally, we also consider the limiting case without finite population effect
(n → ∞). With n going to infinity, the number y¯ goes to infinity, too. So we
cannot indicate the respective absorbing state with y¯. We use the share of agents
playing C in dependence of the costs c instead. Consequently, an absorbing state
C˜4c−1C˜4c−1 means that for c = 0.3 one fifth (= 4 ∗ 0.3 − 1) of the H-types and
one fifth of the L-types play C.
Figure 4: Minimal segregation, infinite n.
H C˜0C˜0 C˜4c−1C˜∗4c−1 C˜1C˜1
L C˜0C˜0 C˜4c−1C˜∗4c−1 C˜1C˜1
c
0 14
1
2
3
4 1
From Figure 4 we can see that without finite population effect the type of
innovator is irrelevant. If c < 1/4, then all players will end up using D. For
1/4 < c < 1/2, the fraction of H-types and L-types using C is equal and strictly
increasing in c. Finally, for c > 1/2, all agents play C. This is interesting because
with global information in the limiting case when the number of players is large
we get the result that if c ≶ 12 , the absorbing state is "D "D ("C "C) (see Proposition
3). Thus, local information reduces the spread of the strategy D if agents are
minimally segregated.
4.4 Maximal versus Minimal Segregation
We conclude this section with a comparison of the absorbing states of a maximally
and of a minimally segregated population. For this comparison we calculate the
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expected share of agents playing C in the absorbing state when each agent is
equally likely to innovate D. We focus on large populations (n → ∞) such
that finite population effects can be neglected. Another consequence of this
assumption is that the role of edge players (of which there are but two of each type
in the maximally segregated population and none in the minimally segregated
population) becomes negligible.
Figure 5 depicts the expected shares of agents playing C in the absorbing
states for maximally and minimally segregated populations. The left-hand panel
displays the shares for both populations when D is introduced by an H-type,
while the right-hand panel displays these shares if innovation occurs by an L-
type.
Figure 5: Comparing maximal and minimal segregation, infinite n.
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There are two things worth pointing out. First, in a minimally segregated
population the location of the innovator does not matter. Consequently, for a
minimally segregated population the graph depicting the share of agents playing
C (the dotted curves in Figure 5) is identical in both panels. Second, if the in-
novator is a low type, then a minimally segregated population is more resistant
against the cheating strategy D than a maximally segregated population. The
reason for this result is that in a minimally segregated population each low type
(including the innovator) is surrounded by two high types who are less prone
to imitate D. In contrast, if the innovator is a high type, then a maximally
segregated population is more resistant against D than a minimally segregated
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population. The reason for this result is that in a maximally segregated popu-
lation the innovator is again surrounded by high types which are less prone to
imitate D.
Proposition 7 Consider a large population (n → ∞). Then, if each agent is
equally likely to innovate the cheating strategy D, the following is true.
If c < 28 , all agents play D in the absorbing state for both distributions of types.
If 28 < c <
3
8 , more agents play D in a minimally segregated population than in a
maximally segregated one.
If 38 < c <
6
8 , less agents play D in a minimally segregated population than in a
maximally segregated one.
Finally, if c > 68 , all agents play C in the absorbing state for both distributions
of types.
These results follow from Propositions 5 and 6. They are depicted in Figure
6.
Figure 6: Comparing maximal and minimal segregation, infinite n.
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For c ∈ (38 , 68) the minimally segregated population exhibits a higher share of
agents playing C in the absorbing state than the maximally segregated popula-
tion. The reason for this is that being located between L-types, the H-types are
able to block the spread of strategy D. However, for sufficiently low cheating
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costs, i.e. for c ∈ ( 28 , 38), the maximally segregated population exhibits a higher
share of agents playing C. The reason is that in a maximally segregated pop-
ulation L-types never observe D if the innovator is a H-type. In contrast, in a
minimally segregated population, if D is introduced by a H-type, two L-type will
observe it. And since L-types are more likely to be infected than H-types the
population share of agents playing D is larger with minimal segregation.
5 Mutations
In this section we introduce mutations. In each period, after imitations have
occurred, each agent’s strategy changes with a small probability ε.7 As mentioned
before, the imitation dynamics is a Markov chain evolving over the strategy space
S. A probability distribution over S in time t is represented as a row vector ν
which is an element of the 2N -dimensional simplex. The simplex ΣN is the set
ΣN =
{
ν ∈ IR2N
∣∣∣∣∣ νi ≥ 0 and∑
i
νi = 1 for i = 1, 2, ..., 2
N
}
.
The process evolves according to νt+1 = νtP , where P is the transition probability
matrix defined in Section 2.3. Now that agents’ strategies change with probability
ε after imitation, the transition probability pij is positive for all i and j, i.e. the
Markov chain is regular. Thus, there exists a unique probability distribution
µ ∈ ΣN such that8
µP = µ .
The vector µ is the unique stationary distribution of the regular Markov process,
which does not depend on the initial probability distribution. The stationary
distribution µ is stable, i.e.
lim
t→∞
νP t = µ ∀ ν ∈ ΣN .
¿From the law of large numbers for regular Markov chains we have
E
[
1
T
T∑
t=1
zi,t
]
→ µi with zi,t =
{
1 if st = i
0 otherwise
7See Kandori et al. (1993, p.38) or Ellison (1993, p.1050) for an interpretation of ε.
8See e.g. Kemeny and Snell (1960), Theorem 4.1.6.(b).
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as T tends to infinity.9 Therefore, the probabilities in the limiting distribution
can be interpreted as average share of time the process spends in a given state.
The transition matrix P (ε) and the stationary distribution µ(ε) depend on ε.
The stationary and stable probability distribution µ(ε) describes the long-run
behavior of the imitation dynamics with mutations. Since we are interested in
the imitation dynamics for small ε, we consider the limiting distribution µ∗:
µ∗ = lim
ε→0
µ(ε) .
The limiting distribution µ∗, if it exists, depends on the parameter values {c, n}
of our model. Even for very small populations, evaluating µ∗ involves solving
a large equation system of 22n variables. Instead of finding µ (ε) explicitly and
taking the limit for ε → 0, we approximate µ∗ numerically. We will describe µ∗
for a maximally segregated population and the smallest population size (n = 5)
that provides all relevant positions of innovation (i.e. H I , HNE, HE, and L) as
described previously. Our simulations suggest that the following results hold.10
Conjecture 1 If a population is maximally segregated and the individual muta-
tion rate ε goes to zero, then our simulations indicate the following. If c < n2(N−1) ,
we have Pr( "D "D) = 1, for n2(N−1) < c <
2n−2
2(N−1) then Pr( "D "C
∗) = 1, for 2n−22(N−1) <
c < 2n+22(N−1) , then Pr(M) = 1 where M =
{
"D "D, "D "C∗, "D "C, "C "D, "C "D∗, "C "C
}
, for
2n+2
2(N−1) < c <
3n
2(N−1) then Pr( "C "D
∗) = 1, and for c > 3n2(N−1) , then Pr( "C "C) = 1.
We illustrate our conjecture for n = 5 and n →∞ in the following Figures.
Figure 7: Maximal segregation with mutations, n = 5.
"D "D "D "C∗ M "C "D∗ "C "C
c
0 518
8
18
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18
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Figure 7 demonstrates that the absorbing state "D "D arising from
c ∈
(
n+2
2(N−1) ,
2n− 12
2(N−1)
)
in the model without mutations disappears. Nevertheless,
9See e.g. Kemeny and Snell (1960), Theorems 4.1.6.(a) and 4.2.1.
10The Matlab file with our simulations can be downloaded at
http://www.unibas.ch/wwz/witheo/aleks/doping/Doping.htm.
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we still observe non-monotonicity because "D "D is an element of the absorbing set
M and is played with strictly positive probability.
Again, an interesting case is the limiting case when n →∞, depicted in Figure
8.
Figure 8: Maximal segregation with mutations, infinite n.
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For c < 14 , the model with mutations and the deterministic model both give
way to the absorbing state "D "D. If 14 < c <
1
2 , the absorbing state
"D "C∗ is reached
with probability 1 in the model with mutations. In the deterministic model, on
the other hand, the absorbing state is "C "C if the innovator is an HI-type and "D "D
otherwise. From this we conclude that our results in the deterministic model are
not robust with respect to mutations. This is not so surprising, since due to the
imitation rule, agents can only imitate strategies they observe in their information
set. Thus, in the absorbing states "C "C and "D "D, the population is locked in. This
cannot occur with mutations. For 12 < c <
3
4 , the model without mutations
exhibits another lock-in, which arises if the innovation occurs through an H I- or
an HNE-type. For c > 34 , the model with mutations and the deterministic model
have the same absorbing state, "C "C.
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6 Conclusions
In this paper we consider an evolutionary game where agents can either play
fair or cheat. A cheating agent bears some direct utility cost but wins the stage
game against a fair playing agent with certainty. The paper extends the standard
framework of an evolutionary game by introducing heterogeneity among agents.
There are two types of agents where high types have a natural advantage over low
types, i.e. they win the stage game with certainty if both agents apply the same
strategy. A consequence of the two type assumption is that there are two stage
games. If two agents of equal type are matched, the stage game is a standard
Prisoner’s Dilemma. If they are of opposite type, then the stage game is an
asymmetric game similar to a matching penny game.
We consider the imitation dynamics when initially all agents play fair and
one agent invents the cheating strategy. In contrast to the standard framework,
with heterogenous agents the absorbing state depends on the location and the
type of the innovator, the distribution of types on the circle, and the information
(i.e. local or global) available to the agents. The paper shows how these factors
determine whether the innovator is able to infect his neighbors and eventually to
contaminate the entire population.
We focus on two distribution of types: maximal (equal types are located next
to each other) and minimal (agents have always neighbors of opposite type) seg-
regation. The following results emerge from the model. First, the population
is more likely to end up in an absorbing state where all agents cheat if the in-
novator is a low type. Second, if the innovator is a low type, then a minimally
segregated population is more resistant against the cheating strategy than a max-
imally segregated population. Third, in contrast, if the innovator is a high type, a
maximally segregated population is more resistant against the cheating strategy
than a minimally segregated population.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3
If the innovating agent is an H-type, the initial numbers of clean agents are
yH = nH − 1 and yL = nL. If the innovator is an L-type, these numbers are
yH = nH and yL = nL − 1. We first notice that due to global information we
have that
∆H(yH , yL) = ∆L(yH , yL) .
We therefore drop the type group index of the decision terms.
If the innovation arises from an H-type, the decision term for all agents is
∆(nH − 1, nL) = uH(1, nH − 1, nL)
− (nH − 1)uH(0, nH − 1, nL) + nLuL(0, nH − 1, nL)
N − 1 .
From (4) and (5) we get
uH(di, nH − 1, nL) = N + nL − 2
2(N − 1) + di
(
nH
2(N − 1) − c
)
and
uL(di, nH − 1, nL) = nL − 1
2(N − 1) + di
(
N + nH − 2
2(N − 1) − c
)
, respectively.
Using this information we get
∆(nH − 1, nL) = nL + nH
2(nL + nH − 1) − c.
If the innovation arises from an L-type agent, the difference in the average payoffs
is
∆(nH , nL − 1) = uL(1, nH , nL − 1)
− nHuH(0, nH , nL − 1) + (nL − 1)uL(0, nH , nL − 1)
N − 1 .
From (4) and (5) we get
uH(di, nH , nL − 1) = N + nL − 3
2(N − 1) + di
(
nH + 2
2(N − 1) − c
)
and
uL(di, yH , nL − 1) = nL − 2
2(N − 1) + di
(
N + nH
2(N − 1) − c
)
, respectively.
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Using this information we get
∆(nH , nL − 1) = nL + nH
2(nL + nH − 1) − c.
Note that
∆(nH , nL − 1) = ∆(nH − 1, nL) .
Consequently, the origin of the innovation does not matter if agents have no type
information.
Proof of Proposition 4
If agents have complete information, they have both strategies available at any
point in time, distinguish types and are able to calculate the payoff they would
have gotten having played the other strategy. Under these circumstances the
imitation rule (2) can be interpreted as a best response dynamics. As before, we
can define suitable decision terms. We have
∆H(yH , yL) = uH(1, yH , yL)− uH(0, yH , yL) = nH + 2nL − 2yL
2(N − 1) − c , (13)
∆L(yH , yL) = uL(1, yH , yL)− uL(0, yH , yL) = nL + 2yH
2(N − 1) − c . (14)
At the end of the first period the agents decide either to play
• "D "D, if c < nH2(N−1) when H innovates (from ∆H(nH − 1, nL) > 0)
or if c < nH+22(N−1) when L innovates (from ∆H(nH , nL − 1) > 0)
• "C "D, if nH2(N−1) < c < 2nH+nL−22(N−1) when H innovates (from ∆H(nH−1, nL) < 0
and ∆L(nH − 1, nL) > 0)
or if nH+22(N−1) < c <
2nH+nL
2(N−1) when L innovates (from ∆H(nH , nL− 1) < 0 and
∆L(nH , nL − 1) > 0)
• "C "C for 2nH+nL−22(N−1) < c when H innovates (from ∆L(nH − 1, nL) < 0)
or if 2nH+nL2(N−1) < c when L innovates (from ∆L(nH , nL − 1) < 0).
Note that "D "C will not be played in the second period because of ∆H(nH −
1, nL) < ∆L(nH − 1, nL) and ∆H(nH , nL − 1) < ∆L(nH , nL − 1). What kind of
∆H and ∆L do these strategy states imply?
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• All play C (situation "C "C), implies
∆H(nH , nL) =
nH
2(N − 1) − c and ∆L(nH , nL) =
2nH + nL
2(N − 1) − c ,
• all play D (situation "D "D), implies
∆H(0, 0) =
nH + 2nL
2(N − 1) − c and ∆L(0, 0) =
nL
2(N − 1) − c ,
• group H plays C and group L plays D (situation "C "D), implies
∆H(nH , 0) =
nH + 2nL
2(N − 1) − c and ∆L(nH , 0) =
2nH + nL
2(N − 1) − c ,
• group H plays D and group L plays C (situation "D "C), implies
∆H(0, nL) =
nH
2(N − 1) − c and ∆L(0, nL) =
nL
2(N − 1) − c .
From (13) and (14) it is clear that "C "C is an equilibrium strategy state if
c > max{nH + 2nL
2(N − 1) ,
2nH + nL
2(N − 1) }
and "D "D is an absorbing state if
c < min{ nH
2(N − 1) ,
nL
2(N − 1)} .
If c does not satisfy one of these two conditions we can work out the following
cycle by using the ∆-functions above:
... → "C "D → "D "D → "D "C → "C "C → "C "D → "D "D → "D "C → ...
For c in an interval [min{ nH2(N−1) , nL2(N−1)},max{nH+2nL2(N−1) , 2nH+nL2(N−1) }] we will observe
an absorbing set of strategy states. The imitation dynamics cycles between the
four strategy states
{
"C "D, "D "D, "D "C, "C "C
}
, where a single agent plays C for two
periods followed by D for two periods etc. The strategy states specific to the two
type groups are shifted in time by one or three periods, depending on where in
the cycle we start to count.
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Decision Terms for Edge Players
The decision terms for an edge player of type H are
∆1HE(yH , yL) = uH(1, yH , yL)− uL(0, yH , yL)
=
nH + 2nL + yH − yL
2(N − 1) − c , (15)
∆2HE(yH , yL) = uH(1, yH , yL)−
1
2
[uH(0, yH , yL) + uL(0, yH , yL)]
=
nH + 2nL +
1
2yH − 32yL
2(N − 1) − c , (16)
∆3HE(yH , yL) =
1
2
[uH(1, yH , yL) + uL(1, yH , yL)]− uH(0, yH , yL)
=
1
2nH +
3
2nL +
1
2yH − 32yL
2(N − 1) − c , (17)
∆4HE(yH , yL) = uL(1, yH , yL)− uH(0, yH , yL)
=
nL + yH − yL
2(N − 1) − c . (18)
For an edge player of type L we get
∆1LE(yH , yL) = uL(1, yH , yL)− uH(0, yH , yL)
=
nL + yH − yL
2(N − 1) − c , (19)
∆2LE(yH , yL) = uL(1, yH , yL)−
1
2
[uH(0, yH , yL) + uL(0, yH , yL)]
=
nL +
3
2yH − 12yL
2(N − 1) − c, (20)
∆3LE(yH , yL) =
1
2
[uL(1, yH , yL) + uH(1, yH , yL)]− uL(0, yH , yL)
=
1
2nH +
3
2nL +
3
2yH − 12yL
2(N − 1) − c , (21)
∆4LE(yH , yL) = uH(1, yH , yL)− uL(0, yH , yL)
=
nH + 2nL + yH − yL
2(N − 1) − c . (22)
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Decision Terms for Double-Edge Players
For a double-edge player of type H the decision terms are
∆1HEE(yH , yL) =
nL + yH − yL
2(N − 1) − c , (23)
∆2HEE(yH , yL) =
nL +
3
2yH − 12yL
2(N − 1) − c , (24)
∆3HEE(yH , yL) =
1
2nH +
3
2nL +
3
2yH − 12yL
2(N − 1) − c , (25)
∆4HEE(yH , yL) =
nH + 2nL + yH − yL
2 (N − 1) − c , (26)
and for a double-edge player of type L they are
∆1LEE(yH , yL) =
nH + 2nL + yH − yL
2(N − 1) − c , (27)
∆2LEE(yH , yL) =
nH + 2nL +
1
2yH − 32yL
2(N − 1) − c , (28)
∆3LEE(yH , yL) =
1
2nH +
3
2nL +
1
2yH − 32yL
2(N − 1) − c , (29)
∆4LEE(yH , yL) =
nL + yH − yL
2(N − 1) − c . (30)
Proof of Proposition 5
We accomplish the proof of Proposition 5 in two parts. We first consider the
absorbing states when an L-type introduces D.
L-type introduces D.
In the following we assume that the innovator is an interior player LI . The
absorbing states are the same when an LNE or an LE innovates D.
(a) If c > 3n2(N−1) , in the absorbing state all players play C because from (5)
∆LI (n, n− 1) < 0. Consequently, D dies out immediately.
(b) If c ∈
(
2n
2(N−1) ,
3n
2(N−1)
)
the absorbing state is "C "D∗. This interval can be
divided into two subintervals. First, if c ∈
(
5
2n−1
2(N−1) ,
3n
2(N−1)
)
in the absorbing state
all LI play D, and the two LE and all H-types play C. If c < 3n2(N−1) , interior
players of type L imitate D because ∆LI (n, yL) =
3n
2(N−1) − c > 0. (Note that
∆LI (n, yL) does not depend on yL). At one point in time, an L
E observes D. He
adopts it if ∆2LE(n, yL) =
5
2n− 12yL
2(N−1) − c > 0. Since ∆2LE depends negatively on yL,
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∆2LE is increasing when the number of L
I using D increases. Thus, ∆2LE(n, yL) is
maximal when yL = 2. Consequently, if
5
2n−1
2(N−1) − c > 0, the edge players of type
L never adopt D, and an absorbing state is reached.
Second, if c ∈
(
2n
2(N−1) ,
5
2n−1
2(N−1)
)
, in the absorbing state all H play C, all LI play
C, and the LE cycle between D and C. If c <
5
2n−1
2(N−1) , an L
E-type imitates D. The
first HE-agent observing D has the decision term ∆4HE(yH , yL) =
n+yH−yL
2(N−1) − c.
He adopts D if ∆4HE(yH , yL) > 0. Since all H−types still use C we have yH = n.
Let us first assume that c is such that he does not imitate D. Then, the number
L-types adopting D is increasing because their decision term does not depend on
yL. Consequently, yL decreases to 0 implying ∆4HE(n, 0) =
N
2(N−1) − c.11 Thus, if
2n
2(N−1) < c <
5
2n−1
2(N−1) all H-types play C and the L
E-types cycle between C and
D because ∆1LE(n, 0) < 0 and ∆
2
LE(n, 2) > 0.
(c) If c < 2n2(N−1) , in the absorbing state all players play D. If c <
2n
2(N−1) ,
∆4HE(yH , yL) > 0. Then, from (9) all other H-types will also imitate D. Note
that L-types continue to use D because they do not observe strategy C in their
information set anymore. Consequently, in the absorbing state all players play
D.
H-type introduces D.
(i)
If an HI introduces D, we have to consider the intervals c ∈
(
0, n2(N−1)
)
and
c ∈
(
n
2(N−1) , 1
)
.
(a) If c > n2(N−1) , then ∆HI (n− 1, n) < 0 and D is extinguished in the second
period. The absorbing state is "C "C.
(b) If c < n2(N−1) , then ∆HI (n − 1, n) > 0, and the HI that observe D will
play it in the second period. In the following periods, more and more H I will
switch to D since ∆HI is unchanged as long as only H-types observe D. At
some point an HE will observe D. His decision term is ∆2HE , which from (9),
is always higher than ∆HI (n − 1, n). So he will adopt. The next player to
11Note that yL can only become 1 and not 0 if n is even. Start counting outward from an
LI inventing D. Since n is even, it takes an uneven number of periods from the period the
the first LE observes D until the second LE observes D. As explained in the text, the LE
cycle between C and D for the interval under consideration. Hence the two LE do not play the
same strategies in any given period. This shifts the lower bound of the respective interval to
c ∈
(
2n−1
2(N−1) ,
5
2n−1
2(N−1)
)
for even n. In the Proposition we state the result for odd n.
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consider is LE. His decision term is ∆4LE(yH , n). He also adopts D because
∆4LE(yH , yL) > ∆HI (yH , yL) > 0. Now all L
I adopt D too, since ∆LI > 0 for
c < nn(N−1) . The last question we have to answer is whether the decreasing yH
or yL can stop the spreading in either of the two groups. For the H-types this
is not the case because ∆HI is decreasing in yL. For the L-types we find that if
c < n2(N−1) , then ∆LI is always positive. Consequently, if c <
n
2(N−1) , the absorb-
ing state is "D "D.
(ii)
If an HNE invents D, one HI and one HE observe D. For this reason, it is con-
venient to divide the proof into three subsections: we consider the cost intervals(
0, n2(N−1)
)
,
(
n
2(N−1) ,
2n− 12
2(N−1)
)
, and
(
2n− 12
2(N−1) , 1
)
separately.
(a) If c < n2(N−1) , one can show that all decision terms are strictly positive.
Consequently, the absorbing state is "D "D.
(b) For n2(N−1) < c <
2n− 12
2(N−1) , we find several absorbing states. We derive them
one by one. In the first period we have ∆2HE(n−1, n) > 0 but ∆HI (n−1, n) < 0.
In period t = 2, HE is thus the only agent playing D, since HNE who invented
D abandons it (he decides according to ∆HI ) and H
I does not adopt it. So now
LE, HE and HNE face the decision to imitate D or not. Their decision terms are
∆4LE , ∆
2
HE and ∆HI , valued at (n− 1, n). With c ∈
(
n
2(N−1) ,
2n− 12
2(N−1)
)
we have
∆4LE(n− 1, n) =
3n− 1
2 (N − 1) − c > 0
∆2HE(n− 1, n) =
2n− 12
2 (N − 1) − c > 0
∆HI (n− 1, n) = n2 (N − 1) − c < 0 .
So we know that in period t = 3 LE as well as HE play D and LI , LE, HE,
and HI have to decide to adopt or abandon D. By looking at these four decision
terms (∆LI , ∆
3
LE , ∆
3
HE , and ∆HI ) evaluated at (n − 1, n − 1), it becomes clear
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that the process now is not unique for the whole interval of c ∈
(
n
2(N−1) ,
2n− 12
2(N−1)
)
.
∆LI (n− 1, n− 1) = 3n− 22 (N − 1) − c > 0
∆3LE(n− 1, n− 1) =
3n− 1
2 (N − 1) − c > 0
∆3HE(n− 1, n− 1) =
n + 1
2 (N − 1) − c ≷ 0
∆HI (n− 1, n− 1) = n + 22 (N − 1) − c ≷ 0 .
The HE who has the choice will only adopt D if c < n+12(N−1) . In this case, D
will be played by the whole population: all H I and LI have a positive decision
term such that yH and yL decline by one each period. Also the last two agents
confronted with D, HE and LE imitate D, because
∆2HE(1, 1) =
3n− 1
2 (N − 1) − c > 0
∆2LE(1, 1) =
n + 1
2 (N − 1) − c > 0 . (31)
So for n2(N−1) < c <
n+1
2(N−1) , the absorbing state is "D "D.
It is clear that for a slightly higher c, c ∈
(
n+1
2(N−1) ,
n+2
2(N−1)
)
, D spreads too
in both populations, but once all agents but two play D, LE will not adopt it,
according to (31). Because of
∆LI (0, 1) =
n
2 (N − 1) − c < 0 ,
C will be imitated by the LNE next to LE in the following period, in which case
LE switches to D (the decision term for LE now is ∆3LE , which is positive for the c
under consideration). All L-players but the edge players adopt C then. The edge
players’ decision term ∆2LE cannot be negative for the c under consideration and
thus the H-types are cut off the strategy C. For the interval n+12(N−1) < c <
n+2
2(N−1)
we thus find the absorbing state "D "C∗.
Rising c again, c ∈
(
n+2
2(N−1) ,
2n− 12
2(N−1)
)
, in period t = 4 none of the H-players
will imitate D and it will spread in group L. Once yL is small enough, group H
will adopt strategy D. The absorbing state here is "D "D.
(c) If
(
2n− 12
2(N−1) , 1
)
, we have ∆2HE(n− 1, n) < 0 and ∆HI (n− 1, n) respectively.
So all players give up D in the second period and the absorbing state is "C "C.
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(iii)
If an HE introduces D, an LE and an HI and the introducing HE can decide to
play D or not in the second period. The respective decision terms are
∆4LE(n− 1, n) =
3n− 1
2 (N − 1)
∆2HE(n− 1, n) =
2n− 12
2 (N − 1)
∆HI (n− 1, n) = n2 (N − 1) .
It is convenient to look at the cost intervals
(
0, n2(N−1)
)
,
(
n
2(N−1) ,
2n− 12
2(N−1)
)
,(
2n− 12
2(N−1) ,
3n−1
2(N−1)
)
, and
(
3n−1
2(N−1) , 1
)
separately.
(a) If 0 < c < n2(N−1) , the absorbing state is "C "C because all decision terms
are positive.
(b) If n2(N−1) < c <
2n− 12
2(N−1) then ∆
2
HE(n − 1, n) > 0 and ∆4LE(n − 1, n) > 0,
and ∆HI (n − 1, n) < 0. So in the second period HE and LE only play D. This
situation is what we have analyzed in Part (ii), subsection (b) of this proof. We
can therefore take over these results and conclude the similar dynamics for this
range of the costs.
(c) If
2n− 12
2(N−1) < c <
3n−1
2(N−1)) only L
E plays D in the second period. All
LI adopt D in the following because ∆LI is always negative for the given cost
interval. The spread of strategy D among the L-types will not affect the H-types
strategy choice, they keep playing C because ∆4HE < 0 for the cost interval under
consideration. As discussed before, the LE either cycle between C and D or play
D, the absorbing state for this cost interval is "C "D∗.
(d) If 3n−12(N−1) < c < 1, the strategy D becomes extinct and the absorbing state
is "C "C, because all decision terms are negative.
Proof of Proposition 6
We first assume that an H-type plays D in period t = 1. If ∆4HEE > 0 he
will keep playing D and his two neighbors adopt D if ∆2LEE > 0. We have
∆4HEE(n − 1, n) > ∆2LEE(n − 1, n) and so D becomes extinct if c > 3n−12(N−1) . For
2n− 12
2(N−1) < c <
3n−1
2(N−1) the equilibrium is the initial strategy distribution, because
the neighbors of the inventor do not adopt D, but the HEE keeps playing it.
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We focus on c <
2n− 12
2(N−1) now. As just seen, in t = 2 only the innovator H
EE
and his two neighbors play D. Four players can choose between C and D now,
two HEE (playing C) that have the decision term ∆2HEE and two L
EE (playing D)
that have the decision term ∆3LEE . Since ∆
2
HEE(n−1, n−2) > ∆3LEE(n−1, n−2)
and ∆2HEE(n− 1, n− 2) > 0, there are two cases to be distinguished t = 3: either
all of them adopt D, or the two HEE adopt D and the two LEE do not. The two
cases will actually lead to the same absorbing state: the two LEE will have the
decision term ∆1LEE(yH , yL) in period t = 4 which is greater than ∆
2
HEE(yH , yL)
for all yH and yL, so they will adopt D then. Thus, this second case does not
influence the absorbing state. It is clear that if the two HEE choose to play D,
the LEE will do the same one period later. We neglect it from now on.
There are only two different kind of strategy states in this dynamics. The
first one is of the kind of period t = 3: two HEE with decision term ∆2HEE and
two LEE with ∆3LEE choose between D and C. We call this state L-dominated
because more L-types than H-types play D (to be precise: yL−yH = 1). Picture
period t = 3 to get the intuition. In t = 3, three agents play D, these are located
as follows:
...HLHLH︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
LHL︸ ︷︷ ︸
D
HLHLHL...︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
.
The second kind of strategy state is of the kind of period t = 4: two LEE
with decision term ∆2LEE and two H
EE with decision term ∆3HEE have to decide
between the two strategies. We call this state H-dominated because more H-
types than L-types play D (yH − yL = 1).
...HLHL︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
HLHLH︸ ︷︷ ︸
D
LHLHL...︸ ︷︷ ︸
C
.
Note that for any positive integer x, ∆2LEE(x−2, x−1) as well as∆3HEE(x−2, x−1)
are larger than ∆2HEE(x, x− 1). So if we have reached an H-dominated state, we
will also reach the L-dominated state that features two more L-types playing D.
We conclude that the absorbing state is reached when∆2HEE is negative (∆
2
HEE
depends positively on yH). So only an L-dominated state can be an absorbing
state. The interpretation is that it will always be an H-type that stops the spread
of D. An H-type will at one point halt the spread of D and act as a blocker to
the L-types playing C who would adopt D if they would observe D. The higher c
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is, the earlier the spread of D is halted, that means, the less agents use D in the
absorbing state. We conclude that there exist many different absorbing states,
depending on population size N and the costs c.
We calculate the number of agents playing C in the absorbing state. Since
the absorbing state is L-dominated, we can substitute yL with yH − 1.
∆2HEE =
n + yH +
1
2
2 (N − 1) − c < 0
→ yH < 2c (N − 1)− n− 1
2
.
The solution yH to this inequality must be an odd (even) number if n is even
(odd). This comes from the fact that whenever HEE have the decision term∆2HEE ,
there is an odd number of H-types playing D. This is because yH decreases by
steps of two.
If an L-type agent innovates D in the first period, the same arguments apply.
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